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PRIMARIES 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the 2008 presidential election season concludes, no doubt there 
will be calls to change the presidential nomination system, especially on the 
Democratic Party side.  Already before the current season began, Congress 
explored legislation to prevent the “frontloading” of the primary process 
through the creation of a series of rotating regional primaries.1  The close 
contest for the Democratic Party nomination this winter and spring revealed 
additional issues beyond the timing question.  Critics have argued that the 
caucus system used in some states is unfair and poorly administered,2 that 
the unequal weighting of votes for purposes of delegate selection violates 
 
*
  Richard L. Hasen is the William H. Hannon Distinguished Professor of Law at Loyola Law 
School, Los Angeles.  Thanks to John Khosravi for research assistance and to Kathy Biber Chen, Heath-
er Gerken, and Tova Wang for useful comments and suggestions. 
1
  See Regional Presidential Primary and Caucus Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1905 Before the S. 
Comm., on Rules & Admin., 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/091907TranscriptCorrected.pdf (link) [hereinafter Hearing on S. 
1905].  I testified at that hearing on the constitutionality of S.1905.  My testimony is posted at 
http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2007/HasenTestimony091907.pdf (link). 
2
  See Tova Andrea Wang, The Nevada Caucus Dustup: The Nevada Caucus, Part III, The Century 
Foundation Blog, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.tcf.org/list.asp?type=NC&pubid=1783 (link); TOVA 
ANDREA WANG, THE CENTURY FOUNDATION, HAS AMERICA OUTGROWN THE CAUCUS?  SOME 
THOUGHTS ON RESHAPING THE NOMINATION CONTEST (2007), available at 
http://www.tcf.org/publications/electionreform/caucusbrief.pdf (link); see also infra Part I. 
Within the party nomination systems discussed in this Essay: 
“Caucuses” . . .  are meetings held simultaneously across the state in each neighborhood.  Partici-
pants in each caucus select representatives, usually chosen according to the presidential candidates 
they support, to a higher level caucus or convention.  A pyramidal process eventuates in a state-
wide convention of representatives whose selection is ultimately traceable to the preferences ex-
pressed at the original caucuses.  The statewide convention selects the actual presidential 
nominating delegation. 
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 473 n.m 
(3d ed. 2004). 
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democratic principles,3 and that the fate of the Democratic Party presiden-
tial nomination should not turn on the votes of unelected “superdelegates.”4 
It is certainly possible that the parties themselves will change their 
nomination rules in response to these criticisms, as the parties have done in 
the past.  But in the event the parties cannot agree on changes, Congress 
may consider legislation imposing changes to make the nomination rules 
comply more with the typical “one person, one vote” norms applicable to 
general elections.  At the extreme, Congress might require presidential 
nominations to occur through state-by-state direct primaries conducted un-
der one person, one vote principles.  Here, I explore the question whether 
Congress has the power to impose such primaries on the parties and the 
states if the parties, states, or both object.  I do not consider the wisdom of 
such legislation. 
As I explain, the main argument that parties can advance against Con-
gressional (or for that matter, state) imposition of a direct presidential pri-
mary is that it violates the First Amendment associational rights of political 
parties to determine their method for choosing their standard bearers.5  This 
argument would appear to have much force given recent Supreme Court 
cases recognizing the parties’ rights to overrule the states on the open or 
closed nature of political primaries.  On the other hand, the Court has also 
accepted as “too plain for argument” a governmental power to require par-
ties to use direct primaries to choose their nominees to assure fairness of the 
process.6  So resolution of the question is uncertain. 
The second argument that the parties or the states may raise against 
Congress is that Congress lacks the power under the Constitution to set the 
rules for presidential elections.7  Such an argument reads Congressional 
 
3
  In Texas, for example, heavily Democratic districts are weighted more heavily in delegate selec-
tion than districts with more Republicans, and about a third of the delegates are awarded through cau-
cuses rather than primaries.  In 1988, for example, Michael Dukakis won the state with 33 percent of the 
vote in the Texas primary compared to Jesse Jackson’s 25 percent, but they split Texas delegates almost 
evenly. R.G. Ratcliffe, Texas Delegate System Makes Candidates Choose Their Battles, HOUSTON 
CHRON., Feb. 10, 2008,  at A1, available at 
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/5528612.html (link). 
4
  See Jennifer Parker, Obama or Clinton: Will Party Elite or Voters Decide?, ABC News, Feb. 8, 
2008, http://www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/Story?id=4261986&page=1 (link) (recounting 
controversy over “superdelegates”); see also id. (defining “superdelegates” as “state party leaders, na-
tional party leaders and former Democratic presidents—who get to act as free agents at the party’s con-
vention able to back any candidate they wish.”).  Indeed, some superdelegates, mostly state party chairs, 
have more power than others, because they can appoint up to five additional superdelegates to the con-
vention.  See Stephen Ohlemacher, Some Superdelegates More Super Than Rest, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Apr. 4, 2008, available at 
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5iUzNyFcNiwI9wJ5hiwqFnxejeZJwD8VQTKGG2 (link). 
5
  See infra Part II. 
6
  See infra notes 29–37 and accompanying text. 
7
  See infra Part III. 
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power under Article II of the Constitution narrowly,8 limited to setting the 
time for choosing presidential electors.  Though the textual argument under 
Article II has some force, both Court precedent and policy suggest that the 
courts could well accept Congressional power to impose at least some regu-
lations on the primary process, such as regulations setting the timing of 
primaries or caucuses.  It is not clear whether congressional power would 
extend as far as to the imposition of a direct presidential primary against the 
parties’ and states’ wishes. 
Part I of this Essay briefly reviews complaints from the 2008 election 
season about the presidential nominating process.  Part II considers the par-
ty autonomy argument against congressional legislation imposing a direct 
presidential primary.  Part III considers the Congressional power argument.  
This Essay concludes by noting that even if Congress may lack the power, 
the threat of congressional action could spur the parties to reform them-
selves. 
I. COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION 
PROCESS AND POSSIBLE LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES 
Each state may make its own rules setting forth who may vote in party 
primaries, and these rules are subject to constitutional objections by the po-
litical parties.9  Major party presidential candidates are chosen at presiden-
tial conventions, whose delegates are chosen through primaries or caucuses 
conducted in each state.10  State political parties, generally following the 
rules of the national political parties (the Democratic National Committee 
(DNC) and the Republican National Committee (RNC)), set out specific 
plans for the choosing of delegates for presidential campaigns. 
Controversies over the 2008 presidential nominating process began 
with a dispute over the timing of state contests.  The two major political 
parties set out rules limiting when states could set their primaries or cau-
cuses.11  The Democrats gave a prime position to the Iowa caucus and New 
 
8
  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (vesting with each state’s legislature the power to set the rules for 
choosing presidential electors). 
9
  See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572–73 (2000) (link). 
10
  For an overview of the presidential primary process and the development of the direct primary for 
choosing nominees of the major political parties, see ALAN WARE, THE AMERICAN DIRECT PRIMARY: 
PARTY INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND TRANSFORMATION IN THE NORTH (2003).  I focus here only on the 
two major political parties, the Democratic and Republican parties.  My analysis may not apply to minor 
political parties. 
11
  See Democratic National Committee, Delegate Section Rules for the 2008 Democratic National 
Convention as adopted Aug. 19, 2006, R. 11.A, available at 
http://s3.amazonaws.com/apache.3cdn.net/3e5b3bfa1c1718d07f_6rm6bhyc4.pdf (link); Republican Na-
tional Committee, Rules of the Republican Party as adopted Aug. 30, 2006, R. 15(b)(1)(i) (setting forth 
the timing of the Republican primaries and caucuses and barring any primary before February 5, 2008), 
available at http://www.gop.com/About/Rules11-20.htm (link); see also Republican National Commit-
tee, supra note 11, at R. 16(a)(1) (imposing penalties for states or state parties that violate the timing 
rule). 
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Hampshire primary, and then provided that Nevada and South Carolina 
would have the next opportunity to run contests.12  Michigan and Florida 
violated those rules by setting their contests too early, and the DNC threat-
ened not to seat delegates produced from this procedure.  The question of 
seating the Michigan and Florida delegations at the 2008 Democratic Na-
tional Convention remains in flux as of this writing.13 
Beyond timing questions, much of the controversy over the 2008 pres-
idential nominating process has focused on problems with the casting and 
allocation of delegates on the Democratic side.  The focus has been there 
because the contest between Senators Clinton and Obama for the Democ-
ratic nomination has been so close.  The closeness has increased attention 
both to election administration issues as well as to the rules in place for al-
locating delegates to the convention, rules that often deviate from one per-
son, one vote norms applicable in general elections.  In early February 
2008, I summarized some of the controversies as follows: 
In the Iowa Democratic caucuses last month, Democrats had no right to cast a 
secret ballot.  In tonight’s Super Tuesday primary, Republican Party rules dic-
tate that the state of Georgia will send more delegates (72) than Illinois (70) to 
the party’s presidential nominating convention.  Illinois has a larger population 
than Georgia, but Georgia has more reliable Republican voters.  In the Democ-
ratic Nevada caucuses, rural votes counted more than urban ones, and while 
Hillary Clinton got more popular votes in the state than Barack Obama, it ap-
pears Obama will capture 13 of Nevada’s Democratic delegates compared to 
Clinton’s 12.  Orthodox Jews complained that they couldn’t vote in the Satur-
day morning Nevada caucuses.  In California tonight, if neither Clinton nor 
Obama gets more than 62 percent of the vote in a congressional district, the 
two are likely to split the district-based delegates evenly.  On the Republican 
side in the California primary, Romney and McCain are targeting the few Re-
publican voters in heavily Democratic districts, because some of California’s 
Republican delegates are awarded based on the winner of each congressional 
district, not the statewide winner.  And when the primaries are over, under the 
Democratic Party rules, “superdelegates” such as governors—who have not 
been chosen by voters—could hold the balance of power between Clinton and 
                                                                                                                           
The New Hampshire primary violated Republican Party Rule 15(b)(1)(i), and the applicable penalty 
is a cost of half of New Hampshire’s delegates.  Presumptive Republican nominee John McCain is now 
advocating a change allowing all of New Hampshire’s delegates to be seated.  See John Distaso, I’ll Be 
Back, He Tells Crowd, THE UNION LEADER (Manchester, N.H.), Mar. 13, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.unionleader.com/article.aspx?headline=McCain+says+he’s+ready+for+the+call&articleId=b
3890dec-0543-49ef-bd8b-6460e118e8f5 (link).  Because the Iowa caucus did not formally select con-
vention delegates, it was not subject to a sanction under Republican Party Rule 15.  See ABC News, Po-
litical Radar, RNC Strips Early States of Half Their Delegates, 
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalradar/2007/11/rnc-strips-earl.html (Nov. 8, 2007, 17:58 EST) (link). 
12
  See Democratic National Committee, supra note 11, at Rule 11.A. 
13
  See Ken Thomas, Dean: Dems Will Seat Fla. Delegates, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 2, 2008, 
available at http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5igrYLRrHG3P6lIbs2E7pSH0bxhvgD8VPSOI00 
(link). 
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Obama in a brokered summer convention.14 
The controversies did not end on Super Tuesday.  Voting on the De-
mocratic Party side in Texas was among the most controversial of elections.  
Under the Texas Democratic Party rules, two thirds of the state’s presiden-
tial delegates are chosen through a primary while one third are chosen 
through a caucus held immediately at the conclusion of voting—with the 
caucus open only to those who voted in the primary.15  An estimated 1.1 
million Texas Democrats participated in the caucuses, more than 10 times 
the previous record for caucus participation in Texas.16  Among the com-
plaints were long lines, unclear rules, inadequate ballot materials, and, in a 
few cases, physical confrontations.17  Though Clinton received more votes 
in the Democratic primary, Obama received more votes in the caucuses and 
appears to be entitled to more delegates from Texas than Clinton.18 
Perhaps 2008 is aberrational because of the exceedingly close contest.  
But even if some of the problems from the 2008 nomination season are not 
likely to recur in 2012, a close election season could come again in a future 
election, and that potential has already spurred calls for reform.19  It may be 
that the parties will reform controversial practices themselves, and that 
would be the best option to deal with these controversies.  But if the parties 
do not, the states or Congress may try to step in.   
Congress may be better situated to make changes than the states, as it 
can assess the nomination process nationally and impose a solution that 
avoids interstate competition issues.  One Senate committee has already 
considered legislation to create a rotating regional primary system to end 
the frontloading problem.20  But I also expect there will be more far-
reaching proposals, such as those requiring that the parties choose their 
presidential nominees through primaries, perhaps conducted under a one 
 
14
  Richard L. Hasen , Whatever Happened to “One Person, One Vote”?  Why the Crazy Caucus and 
Primary Rules are Legal, SLATE, Feb. 5, 2008, http://www.slate.com//id/2183751/ (link). 
15
  See Ratcliffe, supra note 3. 
16
  See Karen Brooks and Emily Ramshaw, Caucuses Cause for Contention: Record Turnout puts 




  See id.; see also Marty Schladen, Democratic Caucus Disputes Move to Next Phase, GALVESTON 
COUNTY DAILY NEWS, Mar. 13, 2008, 
http://galvestondailynews.com/story.lasso?ewcd=6379689919a8b7f8 (link);  Editorial, Clumsy Democ-
ratic Dance: Convoluted Caucus Process Requires Quick Reform, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 12, 
2008,  at 10A, available at 
http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/opinion/editorials/stories/031208dnedicaucuses.481c
b2c7.html (link).  
18




  See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 17. 
20
  See Hearing on S. 1905, supra note 1. 
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person, one vote standard.  Under such a proposal, parties would still be 
able to allocate delegates however they see fit for other party purposes, such 
as approving the party platform.  But the presidential selection choice 
would have to reflect the results of party primaries, weighing each state’s 
primary voters’ votes equally.21  The remainder of this short Essay considers 
the constitutionality of such legislation.22 
II. PARTY AUTONOMY OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY DIRECT AND 
EQUAL PRIMARIES FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
Political parties objecting to proposed legislation establishing manda-
tory one person, one vote primaries in each state for choosing presidential 
party nominees would argue that such legislation violates the parties’ First 
Amendment right of freedom of association.  This is not the place to can-
vass all of the law related to regulation of the major political parties, which 
for some purposes are treated as state actors and for other purposes as pri-
vate associations entitled to protection from government interference.23  
Here I focus specifically on whether such a mandatory primary system 
would violate the First Amendment. 
Parties certainly can draw upon Supreme Court caselaw establishing 
that the First Amendment bars states from requiring that primaries be 
“open” or “closed” to nonparty members.24  Moreover, the Court has held 
 
21
  Parties would remain free to decide whether or not to have open or closed primaries.  In an open 
primary, independents (or sometimes even voters from other parties) are allowed to vote in the primary.  
In closed primaries, only party members may vote. 
22
  There are less radical measures that Congress might impose.  For example, it might do away with 
caucuses but not impose a one person, one vote requirement on primaries.  Or, Congress might use the 
carrot of federal primary financing to entice states to adhere to a certain schedule or set of rules.  Cf. 
John Nichols, The Mad-Money Primary Race, THE NATION, Jan. 21, 2008, 
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080121/nichols (link) (“Congress could promise federal grants to cov-
er all expenses incurred by states that run primaries on a schedule proposed by the commission and ac-
cepted by the national parties.  That incentive might also encourage states to do away with 
antidemocratic caucuses . . . .”).  Regardless of the specific measures imposed by Congress, the more 
control left to the states and parties by congressional legislation, the more likely the courts would view 
the proposed legislation as constitutional.  See infra  Part III. 
23
  For a review, see LOWENSTEIN & HASEN, supra note 2, at ch. 9. 
24
  See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (link) (holding a Connecticut 
law barring the Republican party from allowing independent voters to vote in party primaries unconsti-
tutional); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (link) (holding a California law requiring 
political parties to allow any registered voters, regardless of political party, to vote in party primaries 
unconstitutional); cf. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S.Ct. 1184 (2008) (link) 
(holding that a nonpartisan primary allowing candidates to state a “party preference” on the ballot is not 
facially unconstitutional). 
Technically the Court has not considered the constitutionality of imposing an “open” primary against 
a party’s consent.  Jones concerned a “blanket” primary.  530 U.S. at 569.  In open primaries, voters can 
vote for candidates of any party.  See id. at 577–78 n.8.  However, if a voter chooses to vote for one par-
ty’s candidate for one office then that voter must also vote among that party’s candidates for all other 
offices contested in that election.  Id. at 576 n.6.  The voter cannot vote for a candidate of one party for 
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that while a state can hold an open or closed primary as it wishes to choose 
delegates to the presidential nominating convention, the state cannot force 
the national political parties to seat those delegates at the convention.25 
In addition, lower courts have rejected challenges to party rules on 
grounds they violate the usual rules we apply to democratic elections, such 
as the one person, one vote standard.26  In Bachur v. Democratic National 
Party, the Fourth Circuit rejected a challenge to a DNC rule requiring pro-
portional representation of women among delegates.27  In so holding, the 
court reasoned that because primary votes are so removed from the ultimate 
choice of presidential party nominee, and because delegates perform a 
number of internal party functions besides choosing a nominee, rules appli-
cable to general elections need not apply: 
Bachur’s vote for delegates is some steps removed from a vote for an actual 
candidate for public office.  Delegates for practical purposes constitute the Na-
tional Party—they make its rules, adopt its platform, provide for its govern-
ance, as well as nominate candidates.  However, standing between the 
individual voter and the eventual nomination of a candidate may be numerous 
party rules and procedures so that the will of the majority of the electorate ex-
pressing a presidential preference and the selection of delegates may be only 
partially translated into the actual nomination.28 
Given these precedents, one might think that Congress would have a 
hard time convincing the courts that such legislation is indeed constitu-
tional.  However, dicta from three Supreme Court cases, one as recently as 
this term, gives hope to those who support the constitutionality of such a 
law.  The dicta originated in American Party of Texas v. White in which the 
Court upheld a Texas requirement that minor parties choose their nominees 
by convention rather than through a primary.29  The Court wrote: “It is too 
plain for argument . . . that the State may limit each political party to one 
candidate for each office on the ballot and may insist that intraparty compe-
tition be settled before the general election by primary election or party 
convention.”30 
                                                                                                                           
one office and also vote for a candidate of another party for another office.  Id.  In other words, “the vot-
er is limited to one party’s ballot.”  Id. at 577–78 n.8  In the blanket primary discussed in Jones, voters 
could vote for candidates of any party for any office; they did not have to choose among candidates of 
the same party for all offices contested in that election.  Id. at 576 n.6, 577–78 n.8.  
25
  See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (link); see also 
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489–91 (1975) (link). 
26
  See, e.g., Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 581–87 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
27
  Bachur v. Democratic National Party, 836 F.2d 837, 842–43 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding Democ-
ratic party gender delegate rules). 
28
  Id. at 841–42. 
29
  415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (link).  White relied upon another case the Court decided the same day, 
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (link), which did not itself contain this statement.  
30
  White, 415 U.S. at 781. 
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The “too plain for argument” language appears in two other Supreme 
Court cases as well, and it has now taken an interesting turn that could 
boost the chances of the congressional legislation this Essay considers.31  In 
California Democratic Party v. Jones,32 the Court cited the White language 
in noting that “[s]tates have a major role to play in structuring and monitor-
ing the election process, including primaries.”33 Then this term, in New York 
State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres, Justice Scalia, speaking for seven 
Justices, explained that “when the State gives the party a role in the election 
process”:34 
the State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assuring the fairness 
of the party’s nominating process, enabling it to prescribe what that process 
must be.  We have, for example, considered it to be “too plain for argument” 
that a State may prescribe party use of primaries or conventions to select no-
minees who appear on the general-election ballot.35 
Significantly, the “too plain for argument” language appears to have 
shifted in meaning from White to Lopez Torres.  In White, the concern 
seemed to be about the state’s power to require a primary or convention for 
each party (as the state chose) so as to assure a rational winnowing out of 
candidates.36  By Lopez Torres, however, the Court appears to have em-
braced a “fairness” rationale for the use of primaries.37 
The fairness rationale set out in Lopez Torres lends considerable sup-
port to the idea of a requirement of primaries conducted on a one person, 
one vote basis.  Congress could decide that the usual democratic norm of 
one person, one vote is important enough to apply to all stages of the presi-
dential electoral process.  If even local government elections must comply 
with the one person, one vote rule,38 why not the first stage of the presiden-
tial nominating process, which affects the entire nation? 
The importance of the fairness rationale in Lopez Torres could be over-
stated, however.  The discussion there was dicta not dispositive to the 
case’s outcome.  And though the dicta may seem “too plain for argument” 
when not examined closely, the proposition that the government can over-
rule the parties in their choice of standard bearer may make for a difficult 
argument upon close examination. 
 
31
  Justice Scalia also quoted White in his dissent in Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 
208, 237 (1986) (link). 
32
  530 U.S. 567, 572 (2000) (link). 
33
  Id. 
34
  128 S.Ct. 791, 797 (2008). 
35
  Id. at 798 (citations omitted and emphasis added).  The Court then noted that the power “is not 
without limits,” and cited to its holding in Jones barring a state from requiring a party to allow non-
members to vote in its party primaries.  Id. 
36
  See White, 415 U.S. at 781–88. 
37
  See Lopez Torres, 128 S.Ct. at 797–98. 
38
  See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 478–81 (1968) (link). 
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III. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OBJECTIONS TO MANDATORY DIRECT, 
EQUAL PRIMARIES FOR PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES 
Even if one accepts White, Jones, and Lopez Torres as authority for 
states to require direct, equal primaries on fairness grounds, it is not clear 
that Congress has the same power to do so in presidential elections.  It is to 
this issue that I now turn.39  Though Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution 
gives Congress the power to regulate the time, place and manner of con-
gressional elections,40 Article II gives Congress only the power to set the 
time for choosing presidential electors, leaving the “manner” for choosing 
electors in the hands of state legislatures.41  Based primarily upon this tex-
tual difference, some have argued that Congress lacks the power to impose 
rules related to the presidential nominating process.42 
The textual argument may not carry the day.  No doubt, Congress’s 
power to regulate presidential elections is not coextensive with its power to 
regulate Congressional elections.  For example, Congress could not pass a 
law barring states from using a “winner-take-all” system for choosing pres-
idential electors.43  But Article II of the Constitution does grant Congress 
the power to set a uniform national date for the general election for presi-
dent, and that power to set the time for the general election should extend 
(under the Necessary and Proper Clause) to the power to set the time for the 
nomination of presidential candidates as well.44  It is a harder question 
whether it extends to the power to set the form of the presidential primaries 
over the objections of the states. 
Justice Scalia, relying on the Necessary and Proper Clause, concluded 
that Congress had the power at least to set the time for primaries in a 1981 
article written before he joined the bench: “Since . . . Congress has explicit 
authority under Article II . . . to [determine the time for choosing electors], 
Congress must have at least the authority to specify the dates of primaries 
and even of state and national nominating conventions.”45  Justice Scalia al-
so relied upon the Supreme Court precedent of United States v. Classic,46 
 
39
  The next few paragraphs draw upon my testimony to the Senate Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, supra note 1. 
40
  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
41
  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
42
  The most sustained argument along these lines in the context of anti-frontloading legislation  is 
William G. Mayer and Andrew W. Busch, Can the Federal Government Reform the Presidential Nomi-
nation Process?, 3 ELECTION L.J. 613 (2004). 
43
  See Dan T. Coenen and Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power over Presidential Elections: 
Lessons From the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WILLIAM &  MARY L. REV. 851, 903–04 (2002).  
44
  Antonin Scalia, The Legal Framework for Reform, 4 COMMONSENSE 40, 47 (1981). 
45
  Id. (original emphasis).  He added the caveat that he was not addressing factors “such as states’ 
powers and the parties’ First Amendment rights” that may limit the exercise of this authority.  Id.   
46
  313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941) (link). 
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which used similar reasoning under Article I to hold that Congress could 
regulate Congressional primaries as well as general elections for Congress.47 
Other Supreme Court caselaw bolsters the conclusion that Congress 
has the power to set the time for presidential primaries and perhaps to do 
much more.  In Burroughs v. United States,48 the Court “squarely rejected”49 
the narrow textualist reading of Article II.  The Court held that Congress 
had the power under Article II to regulate corrupt practices that could affect 
presidential elections.  In Buckley v. Valeo,50 the Court upheld Congress’s 
power to regulate campaign financing in both congressional and presiden-
tial elections.  And in Oregon v. Mitchell,51 the Court upheld Congress’s 
power to change the voting age for President to 18.  Justice Black cast the 
decisive vote on the issue, concluding that “[i]t cannot be seriously con-
tended that Congress has less power over the conduct of presidential elec-
tions than it has over congressional elections.”52 
Professors Mayer and Busch have criticized Justice Black’s opinion as 
a “travesty of legal reasoning,”53 given the Constitution’s textual differentia-
tion between Congressional power over congressional and presidential elec-
tions.  But regardless of the merits of the legal analysis, the Justice’s 
opinion (like the majority opinions in Burroughs, Classic, and Buckley) re-
mains good law unless overruled by the Court. 
Indeed, a ruling striking down a congressionally imposed  primary sys-
tem as exceeding Congress’s Article II power would call into question a 
great many congressional laws that regulate presidential elections, from 
campaign finance, to election administration (including aspects of the Na-
tional Voter Registration Act and Help America Vote Act), to the 18-year-
old presidential voting age.  That is not a step the Court would take lightly. 
Nonetheless, a law establishing mandatory, equal, and direct primaries 
for President would go much closer to setting the rules for choosing presi-
dential electors than these other laws do, and might infringe upon the rights 
expressly granted to the states in Article II.  Such a law would pose a diffi-
cult question for the courts: whether Congress, in order to insure fairness 
and uniformity in the presidential nominating process, could go so far as to 
impose such a system over the objections of states interested in maintaining 
their current levels of control over party primaries or caucuses. 
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How might the Supreme Court resolve this conflict?  Consistent with 
the Lopez Torres fairness dicta,54 it could hold that Congress has the power 
to make certain changes to the presidential nomination system under its 
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause,55 
and that this congressional power supersedes Article II when states act in 
ways that undermine political equality.56  The one person, one vote cases are 
grounded in the Equal Protection Clause,57 and a congressional determina-
tion that equality in presidential elections requires imposition of the same 
rule in presidential party nominating contests would merit serious consid-
eration by the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns about the fairness and administrability of the 2008 presiden-
tial nominating process will no doubt spur serious discussions about reform.  
These discussions will take place in states and within each political party.  
Congress may also seek to play a role.  Congress’s constitutional power to 
act in this area, however, is uncertain, but that uncertainty may not be fatal.  
Indeed, congressional threats to legislate change could be the spur that gets 
the parties and the states to change their system to less controversial ones 
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